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BRIEFING PAPERS

SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP, COUNTER INTELLIGENCE STAFF

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE

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Program Objectives
Special Operations Group, Counter Intelligence Staff

The Special Operations Group is responsible for managing and implementing the Agency program for collection and dissemination of information on the countersubversive aspect of counterintelligence. This responsibility includes:

A. Collection: Clandestine collection abroad of information on foreign (Soviet, Chinese Communist, Cuban, North Korean, North Vietnamese, the Communist Front of South Vietnam, [REDACTED]) efforts to support/encourage/exploit domestic extremism and dissidence in the United States. These efforts include funding, training, propaganda, provision of safe haven, provision of alias documentation, etc. The collection emphasis is on foreign involvement, whether directly or by indirect third national leftist groups or individuals. Principal concern is for coverage of foreign involvement in the extremist antiwar movement, extremist student/youth/faculty groups, black extremism, Chicano extremism, Puerto Rican extremism, deserter/evader support and inducement, and international aspects of domestic underground media. Examples of organizations of interest with respect to possible foreign involvement therein include [REDACTED]

B. Dissemination: Information on the above subject, collected by all elements of this Agency, including the Clandestine Service, the Office of Communications, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, and the Domestic Contact Service, is disseminated as obtained

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via special reports series. The bulk of the disseminations are to the Federal Bureau of Investigation but disseminations are also made to other agencies, including the White House as appropriate.

C. Data Base Maintenance: Since all cable and dispatch correspondence in relation to the program is compartmented for reasons of operational security and sensitivity, and is not processed by either the Cable Secretariat or the Information Services Division (ISD) of the Clandestine Service, a complex, highly sophisticated system is utilized for the control and retrieval of this information. (An additional reason for the need for such a system is the receipt of a large volume of reporting from the Federal Bureau of Investigation which requires detailed retrieval capability for pertinent names cited, and which would not otherwise be retrievable under existing ISD procedures.) The control and retrieval system has an on-line remote query and remote input capability and is linked to an IBM 360/67 computer of the Office of Computer Services. Hardware involved includes nine IBM 2260 Cathode Ray Tube Terminals, five IBM 2741 Typewriter Terminals, one Data 100 Offline Printer, and one Data 100 Card Reader.

D. Production: In addition to disseminating pertinent information as collected, the Agency is responsible for preparation and provision of special reports, studies, and estimates on the sub-paragraph A above subject, in response to requirements levied upon it by other elements of the Government. To maximize compartmentation, such special studies, reports, or estimates are prepared by the Special Operations Group, rather than the DDI, utilizing either all information available to the Agency or all information available to the Government, depending upon the nature and scope of the particular requirement.

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
Program Interagency Relationships
Special Operations Group, Counter Intelligence Staff

Implementation of the Agency's program for collection and dissemination of information on foreign exploitation of domestic dissidence and extremism involves a complex series of interagency relationships. These fall into the following categories: operational; dissemination of information; and provision of special studies, reports, and estimates.

A. Operational: Despite the disruption of liaison between the Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the Spring of 1970, the FBI has cooperated operationally with the Special Operations Group along three lines:

1. Exploitation of FBI Sources Abroad:

Most common (about 18 cases since January 1971) has been participation by the Special Operations Group in the briefing and debriefing of FBI New Left and racial extremist sources who travel abroad as part of their undercover activities. Some such travel (five cases, not included in the preceding figure) has even been arranged to meet Special Operations Group needs.



2. Provision of Sources By the FBI: In a

few cases, either in response to a specific request for a specific type of source for long-term use abroad by the Agency, or because an FBI informant who has done a good job for the FBI and who wants to work abroad has asked for it, the FBI has made available FBI sources in this country for turnover to the Agency and use abroad. There are three such sources now active abroad under Agency control and direction.

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3. Provision of Informant Leads To the FBI:

As a converse of sub-paragraph 2 above, the Agency on occasion has provided the FBI with leads on possible informants in the United States on extremist and dissident activity. Such leads arise from efforts to spot and recruit assets suitable for dispatch abroad against targets of this program.

B. Dissemination of Information: Pertinent information is disseminated as collected in response to general standing requirements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Most of this information goes only to the FBI. Roughly 20 to 25 percent of that is responsive to specific FBI requirements. The Special Operations Group evaluates its disseminated product by regularly checking with the FBI on its adequacy and relevance. Counterintelligence of exceptional importance is disseminated over the signature of the Director of CIA and is sent, as appropriate, to the White House, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. The principal White House addressee is the Counsel to the President who has special cognizance over domestic affairs; when appropriate, the information is also sent to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

C. Provision of Special Studies, Reports, and Estimates: In the earlier phase of the program, special studies and estimates were requested by and prepared for the President, his Counsel, and/or the Attorney General. Since mid-1970 such special reports and estimates have been prepared for a highly sensitive interagency committee physically located within the Department of Justice and working on behalf of the White House. This is the Intelligence Evaluation Committee, composed of representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the Secret Service (on behalf of the Treasury Department), the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence

Agency. The primary function of the Committee is the evaluation of domestic intelligence for agreed-on national estimates, and the levying of collection requirements related thereto. The CIA contributions are limited to the foreign aspects. The Chief of the Special Operations Group serves as the representative for the Agency on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee Staff, and as the alternate to the Agency representative in the Committee (who is the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff).


NOTE: Special Problem: There is no written agreement governing the activities of FBI Legal Attaches abroad in dealing with foreign liaison services on collection of information on foreign exploitation of domestic U.S. dissidence and extremism. The DCI has enunciated a policy that the Agency is the action instrumentality of the U.S. Government in this field with foreign liaison services. In actual practice, the FBI levies pertinent requirements directly upon its own Legal Attaches and may or may not come to the Agency for assistance. An informal, usually followed, agreement has been reached, under which the Agency handles FBI requirements in this field (a) in countries where there is no Legal Attache, and (b) in situations in which several countries are involved (including countries in which there is a Legal Attache). Unilateral collection effort is requested of the Agency, however, whether or not there is a Legal Attache.

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
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Operational Program
Special Operations Group, Counter Intelligence Staff

To accomplish its objectives, the Special Operations Group seeks to achieve the maximum feasible utilization of existing resources of the Clandestine Services. Few assets have been recruited and are being run exclusively for this program. Instead, emphasis has been placed on the exploitation of new and old Agency assets who have a by-product capability or a concurrent capability for provision of information responsive to the program's requirements. This involves close continuing liaison with briefed officers in all area divisions and the Soviet Bloc Division; and provision of custom-tailored collection requirements and operational guidance. Where special targets exist, a few agent assets have been specially recruited and deployed against them.




The actual number of assets utilized at any one time varies as new ones arise and old ones are lost.




The assets are dispersed roughly as follows:



Targetting of these assets includes the following groupings (from variety of access/vantage points):



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Because of the emphasis on exploitation of existing assets to the extent feasible and of liaison service capabilities where appropriate, this has been and continues to be a low-cost collection program, particularly in relation to the total number of assets involved and the production therefrom. At present, operational expenses directly chargeable to the program are limited to eight approved operational projects.

The major costs of the program are the salaries of the Special Operations Group personnel and the computer-associated data base maintenance costs. These Headquarters resource requirements are covered in a separate memorandum.

The following statistics are a rough index of the extent of effort involved in the collection and related dissemination program. They show how much is being done.

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with a relatively small resource input. The statistics apply to cables and dispatches sent or received through special handling channels for the exclusive action of the Special Operations Group; to the dissemination prepared and distributed by the Group; and to the number of FBI reports received by the Group for operational support and data base maintenance purposes.

	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1 Jan-31 May 72</u>
Cables In	2593	2190	1071
Cables Out	2114	2217	1076
Dispatches In	1016	1033	355
Dispatches Out	347	315	99
Disseminations (Regular)	746	711	307
Disseminations (Special memos, studies, estimates)	14	37	24
Incoming FBI Reports	10,486	10,110	3,043

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Program Manpower Resource Requirements
Special Operations Group, Counter Intelligence Staff

The program of the Special Operations Group originated in instructions of the Deputy Director for Plans on 15 August 1967, based on instructions to him by the Director, Central Intelligence Agency. These instructions were to establish a program for collection and dissemination of information on foreign involvement in domestic extremism and dissidence; and to maintain an adequate supporting data base, including full control of pertinent related information received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The program started with one officer and one IA, building strength gradually as personnel could be obtained.

The first formal strength authorization was provided in mid-1969 when a total of 36 positions was authorized with the understanding that, if this should prove insufficient, additional personnel would be authorized. (The Chief of the Special Operations Group estimated that a force of about 60 would be required as a minimum to fully implement the required program.)

To facilitate a rapid qualitative buildup of the program, a memorandum was sent in September 1969 by the DCI to each of the Agency Directorates requesting full support to the program; i.e., especially by the Office of Security and Office of Communications in the Support Directorate; by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and the Domestic Contact Service in the Intelligence Directorate; by the Office of Computer Services in the Scientific and Technical Directorate; and by all pertinent elements in the Plans Directorate. As part of the buildup of the Special Operations Group, several key personnel assignments were made in mid and late 1969; i.e., three branch chiefs and a deputy chief.

By mid-1970 the authorized strength of 36 had been achieved and was inadequate for the workload, despite the use of a very large amount of overt

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As a result, the question of overall strength was reviewed and a decision made in late Spring of 1971 that an additional 18 positions would be authorized for the Special Operations Group for fiscal year 1972. Due to the lack of an effective directed assignment system, the Group has been unable to date to build up to its authorized strength (and still is short of the space needed to accommodate that strength).

As of 2 June 1972, the Group has an on-board strength of 42, with two additional officers scheduled to report by early July. Four Group officers, however, are scheduled for transfer out by mid-July. The Group thus needs not only to complete its buildup to authorized strength by filling existing vacancies, but also to obtain replacements for officers still in the Group whose tours with the Group either are already over or are close to their end. The early satisfaction of these personnel requirements is essential to bring a halt to the physical drain on the health of the Group's officers trying to keep up with the enormous continuing volume of work. The Group has been staffed to date primarily by junior officers who are bright and hard-working but who require relatively close supervision because of lack of prior experience. The management span of the senior officers is thus larger than desirable; additional middle grade, experienced officers are required. Replacement of officers at or near the end of their tour of duty is also required to maintain a concept of rotation-tour-staffing which has proven the only effective means of attracting qualified, experienced personnel or bright, ambitious, young personnel.

In fulfillment of a requirement set forth when a 54 strength Group was authorized, a formal Table of Organization has been recently approved. The Group is organized around two worldwide operational branches, each of which is concerned with the collection and dissemination of information on foreign involvement in certain specific aspects of the domestic U.S. scene. These branches are supported by a special operational unit and by sections concerned with the control of correspondence and the maintenance of a retrievable data base. In addition, the Office of Computer Services provides five full man years and two partial man years of programming and system design.

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support for the computer systems under development for and utilized by the Group. Without such computer support, it would be impossible to run this program with the relatively small number of people authorized and with the short time deadlines required to provide effective requirements and guidance for field operations, and to respond effectively to special studies and estimates requirements levied upon the Agency.